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Abstract
In spite of the current panoply of approaches to literary semantics, this pa-
per argues that the discipline su¤ers from one scandalous absence: the the-
orization of Vorstellung, or ‘perceptual modification.’ The paper traces the
trajectory of the elimination of Vorstellung in language semantics from
Frege to Saussure and to the demise of the signified in the post-Saussurean
tradition. Alternative perspectives are introduced that promise the rehabili-
tation of the perceptual ingredients of language, such as cognitive linguistics
(Lako¤) and corporeal pragmatics (Ruthrof), approaches that could be
used to revive literary semantics by granting Vorstellung its proper role in
the theorization of literary meaning.
1. Introduction
There is no such thing as literary semantics, at least not if we understand
semantics as a systematized set of rules abstracted from the practice of
reading literary works. What we have instead is a loosely related body of
writings largely dedicated to the application to literary works of various
approaches to the theorization of natural language and logic. Such writ-
ings range from the exploration of analytic language philosophy, to fea-
tures of Saussurean structuralist accounts, Hallidayan functional linguis-
tics, a variety of theories of metaphor, phenomenological investigations,
semiotic approaches both in the Peircean and Saussurean modes, possible
world theories, and applications of modal and other forms of logic. A
case in point is the Journal of Literary Semantics whose publications,
since its foundation in 1972 by Trevor Eaton, have covered a broad spec-
trum of applications of theorizations of natural language and other sign
systems to literary texts.
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As the current editor of the journal, Michael Toolan writes in his edito-
rial blurb ‘the aim of the Journal of Literary Semantics is to concentrate
the endeavours of theoretical linguistics upon those texts traditionally
classed as literary.’ And indeed, as long as we conceive of ‘theoretical
linguistics’ in a generous sense, the majority of contributions can be re-
garded as applications of a broad spectrum of semiotic theorisations to
literary texts, from perspectives such as systems theory (Sadowski 2002;
Rogers 1982), information processing (Droste 2003), computing (Lou-
werse 1999), possible worlds theory (Charles 1993; Doležel 1976, 1979,
1984–1985; Bailin 2004), relevance theory (Green 1993), psycholinguistics
(R. Eaton 1988), and other disciplines. This collection, as well as a sub-
stantive corpus of books which we could adduce as evidence for the exis-
tence of a semantics of literature (such as Dowling 1999; Toolan 1998;
Doležel 1998; Ruthrof 1992; Sell 1991; Pavel 1986; Kurzweil and Phillips
1983; and Kurrik 1979), suggests that it is indeed this applicatory para-
digm that constitutes literary semantics.
Given such diversity, it should perhaps not be surprising that, even
among some prominent scholars in literary semantics, there is no general
agreement as to the status of the discipline. In 1996, Trevor Eaton, build-
ing on his earlier work The Semantics of Literature (1966), made a force-
ful attempt at establishing the discipline as a ‘science’ in a paper echoed in
a debate that has continued to today. In the same issue, Denis E. B. Pol-
lard added some cautionary remarks, pointing to two main dangers: One,
that literary semantics ‘can become prematurely appropriated by the con-
ceptual framework of another discipline, its own concerns obliterated by
reduction to a ‘‘proprietary’’ vocabulary conceived with rather di¤erent
objectives in mind’; the other, ‘that its subject matter and problems might
become dissipated and lost in a welter of diverse schemes and intellectual
dialects which, in a Kuhnian sense, are likely to be incommensurable.’
(Pollard 1996: 78). In light of the many paradigms brought to bear on the
literary (whatever its contested status), one could rephrase these concerns a
little more sharply. It looks as if a set of literary texts functioned as the
ground zero for di¤erent combat units testing their critical ammunition
with no real interest in the landscape but only in the e¤ectiveness of their
weaponry. From this perspective, incommensurability would be a bonus
rather than a flaw. Pollard, it seems to me, is quite right in raising the ques-
tion of ‘subject matter’: Is the subject matter the application of a variety of
linguistic theorizations or ways of ‘literary meaning making’? Perhaps this
opposition is contrived and should be reconciled by showing how non-
literary theorizations clarify and open up new avenues for the construc-
tion of meaning in literary readings. If so, then all such applications take
on the status of auxiliary tools in the service of literary semantics.
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In two papers, Dieter Freundlieb entered the debate by first attempting
to delimit literary semantics as a discipline by stipulating that it ‘must be
based . . . on the idea that (a) there is a reasonably well-defined set of ob-
jects called literary texts; (b) there either is or can be a systematic study of
the meaning of such texts; (c) the construction of meaning in literary texts
is su‰ciently di¤erent from that found in non-literary texts; and (d) the
systematic study of meaning of literary texts is something that di¤ers
from, and is perhaps superior to, or at least equally important as, other
more hermeneutical approaches to the study of literary texts’ (Freundlieb
1998: 61). Referring especially to Freundlieb’s criteria, Trevor Eaton pro-
posed a description of literary semantics at once more modest and more
ambitious than Freundlieb’s by regarding it as a ‘branch of linguistics
which studies (a) those texts (in relation to their readership) which are
from time to time deemed ‘‘literary’’ and (b) draws from this study meta-
theoretical implications for linguistics as a whole’ (Eaton 1999: 134f.).
Crucial in Freundlieb’s definition seems to me his insistence that literary
meaning construction needs to be recognizably di¤erent from semantic
questions in general, a point omitted in Eaton’s point (a) but curiously
implied in point (b), which argues for literary semantics to act as a master
discipline for language study as a whole. There are good reasons for such
an argument, as I have tried to show in some detail in Pandora and Oc-
cam: On the Limits of Language and Literature (Ruthrof 1992). After all,
literature in both oral and written forms constitutes the most comprehen-
sive language laboratory of cultures around the world.
Perhaps because of the largely ‘applicatory’ character of the practice of
literary semantics, employing forever more extraneous tools to its subject
matter, or perhaps because of insu‰cient theorization within the field
itself, Freundlieb’s more recent contribution to the debate ends on a so-
bering note. ‘I still want to be convinced,’ he writes, ‘that literary seman-
tics can either be a real cognitive science or that it can do better than
traditional literary criticism’ (Freundlieb 2000: 140). The ‘applicatory
approach’ to literary meaning making could be viewed as Heidegger re-
garded the placing of a power station in the river Rhine: it makes un-
reasonable demands on nature by treating it as a mere energy resource,
which however gets us nowhere near understanding the river Rhine
(Heidegger 1978). In his 1935 ‘Vienna Lecture’ Husserl issued a similar
warning against a falsely applied ‘objectivism’ (Husserl 1970: 292, 297).
In defense of the scanning of literary texts by a variety of semiotic theoriza-
tions, one could say that by testing scientific tools on complex phenomena
such as literary texts, we learn a good deal about the explanatory power of
those approaches. Literary semantics then would be a discipline of sharp-
ening non-literary intellectual enterprises by using literature as a test case.
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If we were to accept the de facto applicatory conception of literary se-
mantics, we could also have no objections to the description of natural
language semantics in general, from whatever perspective, be it from the
principles of formal logic or the domain of AI. After all, in all such inves-
tigations, disciplines from outside the definiendum, meaning in natural
language and meaning in literary uses of language, have been imported
as means of the definiens. And if there were no alternatives to such extra-
neous forms of description, there would be no point in deploring that
there is no such thing as literary semantics in any strict sense. Further-
more, what would such a ‘strict sense’ look like? Perhaps the most prom-
ising opening for a semantics evolving out of literary phenomena rather
than generally linguistics was Roman Ingarden’s work initiated in the
1930s. Not surprisingly, Ingarden’s profound theorization about the
nature of the epistemic constitution of complex objects, of which he
regarded the literary work to be a prime example, spawned a long list
of writings foregrounding the reader, whose authors in many cases
were quite oblivious to their phenomenological debts and on the whole
have lost sight of the core issues the Polish philosopher had put on the
agenda. The main di¤erence between applications of theoretical models
of language and other sign systems and Ingarden’s e¤ort seems to me
to lie in the way he tried to show the minimal conditions without
which we cannot perform a literary text in a literary manner. Certainly,
a strong case can be made to argue that The Literary Work of Art (1973
[1930]) and The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art (1973 [1957]),
in addressing aspects of literary performance absent from much of theo-
retical linguistics and related approaches, pointed to a viable alternative
to the applicatory tradition I have sketched, an alternative that fore-
grounds a non-linguistic, though semiotic, feature common to all literary
performance.
2. Enter Vorstellung
There is one aspect of meaning making so central to reading literary texts
and yet so scandalously absent from the dominant theorizations of natu-
ral language that it deserves special mention: Vorstellung, or as I propose
to render the signifier in English ‘perceptual modification’ or ‘perceptual
variation.’ Vorstellung has been translated as ‘imagination,’ ‘mental rep-
resentation,’ ‘representation,’ or ‘mental projection.’ Pluhar proposes
‘presentation’ in translating Kant’s ‘Vorstellung’ in the Critique of Judg-
ment, which comes closest to the German original, yet fails to capture
the act of placing something in front of us, as the act of sich etwas vor-
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stellen (to present something in front of oneself; to imagine something)
suggests (Kant 1987). In Frege’s writings, the term Vorstellung is typically
translated as ‘idea,’ which introduces an ambiguity via abstraction that
should be avoided. What gets lost here is the emphasis on a projecting
act, the re-creative activity of the imagination. But while the English
word ‘imagination’ captures a good deal of what is meant by Vorstellung,
it fails to account well for two important features of Vorstellung. Expres-
sions such as ‘imagination’ and ‘imaginative response’ collapse general
non-linguistic grasp into the domain of the visual and, even more impor-
tantly, lack the realist polarity of the spectrum of meanings that we asso-
ciate with Vorstellung. These di¤erences are all important, for the seman-
tic scope of Vorstellung covers a range of meanings from the most realist
‘imagination’ of an actual situation, as the witness reports of an accident,
my description of a room after closing my eyes, or the recall of a taste or
olfactory experience, to the constructions of the wildest fantasy scenarios.
Part of this side of Vorstellung is also present in the English verb ‘imag-
ine,’ as in such expressions as ‘imagine a situation in which’ or ‘imagine a
sentence with two sub-clauses’ or ‘imagine a car approaching from the
left,’ while the noun ‘imagination’ somehow undermines the realist em-
phasis. In translating Wittgenstein, who often employs phrases like
‘Imagine a situation in which . . . ,’ the German is well translated by
‘imagine,’ while his use of Vorstellung causes di‰culties (Wittgenstein
1986 [1953]: paragraphs 2, 3, 6, 14, 19, 21, 23n., 31, 86, etc.). To pursue
the philosophical consequences of the various renderings of Vorstellung in
translations from German to English would in itself be a fertile topic. Suf-
fice it to say here that Vorstellung has been chosen for this paper in pref-
erence over ‘imagination’ because of its extensive semantic scope from
highly realist to fantasy variations of human perception. It is this breadth
of coverage that makes it uniquely suitable to the description of what
goes on in the performance of literary texts. While Vorstellung is an em-
barrassment to post-Saussurean linguists and post-Fregean philosophers
alike, consider the prominence of Vorstellung in the following, typical
mental activities: in perception as the Vorstellung of the actual (what we
actually taste, smell, touch); realist representation as the Vorstellung of
the absent; memory as the Vorstellung of the past (e.g., a painful emo-
tion); prediction as the Vorstellung of the future; suggestion as the Vor-
stellung of the tentative; certitude as the Vorstellung of what seems com-
pelling; hope as the Vorstellung of what we wish will be the case; fantasy
as the Vorstellung of the possible and impossible; dream as the Vorstel-
lung of the unconscious; hallucination as the Vorstellung of the counter-
factual; utopia as the Vorstellung of a desirable world; or dystopia as the
Vorstellung of a catastrophic world.
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If Vorstellung in itself strikes the reader as too amorphous a concept,
an alternative way of rendering the term is by the intersemiotic Peircean
route, employing the notion of iconicity and the iconic sign, broadly con-
ceived. If we subtract perceptual iconicity from Peirce’s general concept,
what is left is the iconicity of Vorstellung, the multiple forms of perceptual
variation or perceptual modification. We could also call this domain the
‘fictive,’ with the proviso that, here too, highly realist projections play an
important role. Nor is Vorstellung a mere adjunct to reading, something
we could do without, or something we can add at a later stage to color
the basic meanings we have already established. Quite the contrary, with-
out Vorstellung we could not even begin to constitute meanings. For, in
order to make sense of the words in their specific poetic order, we need
to imagine a ‘world’ that gives coherence to individual semantic values.
In other words, Vorstellung is the indispensable tool for achieving a fictive
iconic construal. Let me illustrate this point by the arbitrary choice of a
poem. Take Wilfred Owen’s ‘Futility’ as example.
Move him into the sun —
Gently its touch awoke him once,
At home, whispering of fields unsown.
Always it woke him, even in France,
Until this morning and this snow.
If anything might rouse him now
The kind old sun will know.
Think how it wakes the seeds, —
Woke, once, the clays of a cold star.
Are limbs, so dear-achieved, are sides,
Full-nerved — still warm — too hard to stir?
Was it for this the clay grew tall?
— O what made fatuous sunbeams toil
To break earth’s sleep at all?
As we are reading, Owen’s words come into existence as a poem. This
phenomenological insight is crucial to literary semantics. Word by word,
Owen’s verbally coded image chains are activated by Vorstellung, as are a
series of interpretive abstractions sharable by a community of readers. As
Roman Ingarden cogently demonstrated, the poem’s virtual artistic struc-
ture requires acts of reading for the realization, which he called called
concretizations, of its potential as an ontically heteronomous object, an in-
tentionally constituted entity straddling a number of ontological domains:
materiality (sound, print), ideality (sentence meanings, high-level inter-
pretive abstractions), and fantasy or pure intentionality. These grounding
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principles of phenomenology have since given rise to a rich tradition of
reader-oriented theories. Here we are interested only in using them to
shore up the claim of the primacy of Vorstellung.
Whenever we read the poem, we enact a number of implied as well as
stated instructions. First there is the concealed speech act of all literature:
‘Imagine the following situation.’ This implicit imperative is generically
coded for all poems. When we read texts in a non-literary manner, as for
instance a DNA analysis, we are performing language in a somewhat dif-
ferent manner. In reading a poem, we engage in a specified, community-
sanctioned set of acts by granting our projective powers, our Vorstellung,
a leading role: we are ready to imagine a ‘world.’ The second speech act
we encounter is explicit, but by no means unambiguous: ‘Move him into
the sun —.’ The imperative is polysemous because it could refer to the po-
etic speaker’s thoughts at the time (‘We should move him into the sun’),
to an actual statement (a command by an o‰cer or a suggestion made by
a fellow soldier), or to the reader’s task of creating imagined contrasts be-
tween the slain soldier and the life-generating, gentle power of the sun.
This contrast provides the frame within which the reader’s Vorstellung is
charged to explore what can be typically projected from the two stanzas.
The opening of the second stanza ‘Think how it wakes the seeds,’ is an-
other direct instruction to the readers to unfold their powers of perceptual
variation. The imperative ‘Think’ is not so much a directive to engage in
any sort of thinking, such as doing calculus, engaging in verbal analysis,
or thinking as sorting, deduction, induction or logical inference, all legiti-
mate forms of ‘thinking.’ Rather, the poetic speaker here challenges the
reader to explore a vast nonverbal scenario from the lifeless limbs of the
soldier’s body to the evolutionary history of the earth and so recreate an
all-embracing sense of pity and the kind of human compassion that gave
rise to the composition of the poem itself. Contrary to the popular idea
that language in poetry is self-referential, which is the case to a certain
but limited extent, language here and in all literary texts is primarily
a conduit for imaginative experimentation, for the exploration of the
perceptual variation of our world, whereby ‘perceptual’ refers to our
entire complex of nonverbal realizations and not just the those related to
seeing. In other words, the poem invites us to use language as a medium
through which we contemplate a world created by our Vorstellung as in-
dispensable faculty. This is what is missing or marginalized in our stan-
dard accounts of language. Vorstellung has no room in either the post-
Fregean or the post-Saussurean traditions. Worse, literary semantics
has on the whole not been able to establish itself in the face of the anti-
Vorstellung orientation of the dominant philosophical and linguistic
paradigms.
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If we accept the idea that Vorstellung is essential to sense-making, at
least in reading literary texts, not merely as an additional, pleasurable
activity but as a conditio sine qua non, then we must argue that its role in
literary semantics needs to be fully acknowledged. But how can it be if, as
observed at the beginning of the paper, the discipline has largely bor-
rowed its methods from non-literary theories? In the following summaries
of a number of typical approaches found in literary semantics, the paper
now asks the question of what position of value Vorstellung has been al-
located in each approach.
3. Fregean sense, Saussurean syntax and the demise of the signified
From Frege to Davidson and beyond, analytical language philosophy has
remained within the confines of geometrical assumptions. Sense is defini-
tionally ruled, as in Frege’s ‘pure’ thought of geometrical ‘intersection,’
and so, up to this day, analytical philosophers believe in the definitional
sanctity of ‘sentence meanings,’ even where ‘utterance meanings’ are
admitted. They contain meaning within their propositional confines, and
it is a mistake to assume that speech act theory in the analytical mould
(Austin, Searle) has altered this basic credo. Austin is still able to isolate
a pure ‘locution’ from its enveloping ‘illocution’ and ‘perlocution.’ Per-
haps the upshot of this tradition is Davidson’s radical denial of meta-
phorical meaning, an argument that is as compelling in its consistency
with the analytical definition of sentence meanings inherited from Frege
as it is blind to the actual workings of metaphors and hence the necessity
to radically critique his own credo in the literality of sentence meaning.
As I have argued in detail elsewhere, this situation is the consequence of
Frege’s illegitimate conflation of two kinds of sense, the formal sense of
geometry and the ‘sense’ of natural language expressions. (Ruthrof 1997:
59–76) Given the purity of meaning that Frege was aiming for in order to
create an unambiguous Begri¤sschrift, it is not surprising that he found
Vorstellung an inconvenient by-product of natural languages. This is why
he strictly eliminated Vorstellung from meaning as merely subjective and
a hindrance to his objectivist view of language. Thus exterminated, Vor-
stellung plays no role in analytical language philosophy to this day, a phe-
nomenon that is as much celebrated by those who approach language
from the perspective of logic as it is deadly to literary semantics.
The second fundamental influence on contemporary conceptions of
natural language is that of Saussure, whose achievement of providing lin-
guistics with a scientific basis remains undisputed. From the perspective
of Vorstellung, Saussure proposed a conception of the linguistic signs
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that allowed at least minimally for a retention of the link between lan-
guage and perception. In his notion of the signified as ‘concept’ or ‘image’
the founding father of structuralist linguistics acknowledged that signifiers
alone, unlike in formal sign systems, cannot account for the way in which
natural language works. ‘The linguistic entity exists only through the as-
sociation of the signifier with the signified. Whenever only one element is
retained, the entity vanishes . . . A succession of sounds is linguistic only if
it supports an idea.’ The same applies to ‘the signified as soon as it is sep-
arated from its signifier.’ Crucially, ‘in language, a concept is a quality of
its phonic substance just as a particular slice of sound is a quality of
the concept’ (Saussure 1974: 102f.). However, there are two features in
structuralist linguistics that have undermined the connection between lan-
guage and world. One is Saussure’s strong emphasis on the syntactic con-
stitution of meaning, the other, the post-Saussurean neglect and, more
recently, abolition of the signified (Lamaire 1977: 41; Laclau 1996: 36;
Hayles 1993: 76). Now the work of meaning is done by syntactically or-
ganized signifiers by themselves. While this is a perfect description of such
formal languages as chess, FORTRAN, PASCAL, and other definitional
sign systems, natural language is like chess only at the syntactic but not at
the semantic level. As a consequence, the reduction of linguistics to syn-
tactically ordered signifiers fails to capture what is most important in nat-
ural language: intersubjective, socioculturally saturated meanings. Not
surprisingly, Vorstellung, an important ingredient in the constitution of
such meanings, has no room in a linguistics in which signifieds are either
relegated to the too hard basket or eliminated altogether. When such
forms of linguistics are imported into literary semantics, as they regularly
are, the results are predictable. Foregrounded are syntactic relations,
while the creative, exploratory, imaginative activities that constitute the
main purpose of literary reading, the projection of culturally rich fictive
worlds, are either taken for granted or assumed to be no more than
spurious by-products of signifiers in their discursive formations. Exit
Vorstellung.
It is a curious situation that the post-structuralist intervention by Jac-
ques Derrida has not greatly improved this situation, although he has
confessed to being in sympathy with Peircean semiotics, which includes
iconicity in all its forms. Importantly, unlike many of his less cautious
popularizers, Derrida never abolished either the signified, or meaning in-
tentions, but merely critiqued any claims of presence and origin that we
might wish to associate with them (Derrida 1977). For Derrida, the lin-
guistic sign remains constituted by the reciprocity of signifier and signi-
fied. The signifier cannot be thought without the signified and vice versa.
And yet, Derrida’s critique of phenomenological presence, of Husserl’s
Vorstellung in literary semantics 285
‘now,’ and the assumed stability of signifieds has given rise to a verbocen-
tric emphasis that cannot celebrate Vorstellung either. At the end of post-
structuralism, we have not been able to halt the demise of the signified.
Worse was to come with the postmodernist claim of the fatality of mean-
ing, exemplified in the writings of Baudrillard where, paradoxically, Vor-
stellung is demanded as a strategy of resistance, while it is denied in the
very premises of his theorizing (Baudrillard 1990: 178). No signifieds, no
Vorstellung, no meaning, no conception, let alone resistance. For literary
semantics, this means the reduction of the literary text to mere or empty
signifiers, a position that is not only infertile as far as the imaginative ex-
ploration of texts is concerned but theoretically self-contradictory.
4. The Heideggerian route
Even if Heidegger did not favor the term Vorstellung in his writings, as
did Kant for example, it plays an important role in his remarks on inter-
pretation. The three components of the necessary fore-structure of all
interpretation, fore-sight, fore-grasp, and fore-having, all rely heavily on
the playful employment of perceptual variation. Without these, says Hei-
degger, we could not even begin to interpret. This triple ‘fore-structure’
suggests that we are in a position to interpret only if we have at our dis-
posal at least a minimal understanding of what is then elaborated in the
process of interpreting (Heidegger 1962: 188–213). Here, Vorstellung is
precisely the activity of imaginatively projecting directional possibilities
of interpretation. Importantly, the Heideggerian picture of interpretation
would make little sense if the triple fore-structure were to be restricted to
merely linguistic or perhaps even logical projections, merely more words
or propositions. Quite the contrary, all three aspects of the fore-structure
draw on the rich speculative, imaginative resources of Vorstellung, again
from its most realist realizations to its most imaginative fantasy distor-
tions. Crucially for literary interpretation, a special case of Heidegger’s
general theorization, Vorstellung here comprises our total perceptual
awareness of the world as well as the totality of our imaginative percep-
tual variations.
When Heidegger describes interpretation as an elaboration of under-
standing — which activates what we already know in a certain way,
as well as what we already feel and desire as ingredients of a ‘hermeneu-
tic circle’ (Heidegger 1962: 195) — he isolates its foundational princi-
ple in the ‘as-structure’: something is understood as something else. This
is, of course, also the founding principle of the sign of semiotics, the ali-
quid pro aliquo, reformulated by Peirce to include human agents. Again,
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it would be quite misleading to reduce either Peirce’s or Heidegger’s
formula to linguistic or logical operations, a proviso that applies specifi-
cally to approaches to literary semantics. To regard something in terms of
something else cannot be restricted to associations of linguistic expres-
sions in a lexicon any more than to the alignment of compatible proposi-
tions. To choose an example from Heidegger’s ‘fundamental ontology,’
truth as aletheia, the pre-Socratic unconcealment of what is, unlike the
Aristotelian propositional truth, always transcends the boundaries of the
merely linguistic or merely propositional. What is being compared in
the interpretive ‘as-structure’ is neither words nor logical terms but what
they stand for. This means that linguistic and logical signifiers are indeed
transparent to their signifieds, albeit not in any transcendentally secured
form. Rather, language in interpretation is transparent to negotiatory and
so contestable signifieds, which require a great deal of Vorstellung for
their imaginative projection.
Beyond such technicalities, literature and especially poetry play an
important role, especially in Heidegger’s later work. Here poetry and its
thoughtful contemplation are argued to belong to the few remaining truly
human activities able to render existence in technological modernity
meaningful. This is so, Heidegger says, because poetry uniquely exempli-
fies that language is never merely a tool of communication; rather, the es-
sence of language, as demonstrated by poetry, is always a form of ale-
theia, a mode of revealing, an Entbergen, beyond the surface of habitual
meaning construction. For Heidegger, therefore, the Being of the being of
poetry is aletheia. And what is so revealed is not more language, less just
indicative sentences or propositional contents, but through language a
potential for being thoughtful about human existence and its potential
destiny. Such thoughtfulness, especially in the case of poetry, relies pro-
foundly on the imaginative, philosophically oriented work of Vorstellung.
5. Neurolinguistics and cognitive linguistics
An unexpected boost for Vorstellung has recently come from two sides:
from certain remarks by Noam Chomsky, critical of the behaviorist and
definitional, and so entirely public, determination of meaning in analyti-
cal philosophy; and from a field whose scientific origins would appear to
undermine the very concept of Vorstellung, from neurolinguistics, and es-
pecially the recent work in cognitive linguistics by George Lako¤ and
Mark Johnson (1999). Chomsky, viewing language from the position of
what he calls a ‘methodological naturalism’ compares it to ‘organs of the
body’ and so language, including its most complex mental elaborations,
Vorstellung in literary semantics 287
is regarded as ‘a product of biological evolution’ (Chomsky 2002: 4).
Accordingly, any expression should ultimately be traced back to the
‘computational-representational (C-R) system’ of the brain (Chomsky
2002: 24). Insisting that what goes on in the brain cannot be eliminated
as irrelevant when we try to understand language, Chomsky rightly re-
jects both the analytical notion of a publicly defined meaning (Davidson,
Putnam), as well as Quine’s behaviorist description (2002: 41–46). His
main reason for this opposition is that he believes that cognitive research
has so far established that a spoken statement S is ‘related to inner states
of speakers and hearers, which enter into the ways they interpret it.’ Given
this scenario, ‘communication depends on similarity among these states.’
At the same time, it is in such a manner, says Chomsky, that ‘language
engages the world’ (2002: 164). What I take from this is the prominence
of ‘inner states,’ which I suggest are, to a large measure, what we can call
Vorstellung.
The other major encouragement for looking at Vorstellung as a serious
component of meaning and especially literary semantics comes from cog-
nitive linguistics based on neurological research. In Philosophy in the
Flesh: A Challenge to Western Thought Lako¤ and Johnston propose a
neurologically founded explanation of the metaphoricity of much of nat-
ural language as rooted in the sensorimotor activities of the brain. Bar-
ring a certain anti-philosophical hype, their approach allows for the role
of perceptual grasp and its fantasy extensions as sources of the richness of
human thought. The fundamental principles of Lako¤ and Johnson’s
approach can be encapsulated as follows: Starting from findings in the
neurosciences, the authors argue that ‘the peculiar nature of our bodies
shapes our very possibilities for conceptualization and categorization’
(Lako¤ and Johnson 1999: 19). In turn, concepts are defined as ‘neural
structures that allow us to mentally characterize our categories and rea-
son about them. Human categories are typically conceptualized in more
than one way, in terms of what are called prototypes, neural structures re-
sponsible for the kind of ‘inferential or imaginative’ work typically asso-
ciated with specific categories (1999: 19). Much of our thinking is charac-
terized, they say, by ‘embodied concepts,’ neural structures which are
functionally related to ‘the sensorimotor system of our brains.’ Conse-
quently, the authors argue, ‘much of conceptual inference is, therefore,
sensorimotor inference’ (1999: 20). While Chomsky links the sensorimo-
tor activities mainly with the generation of signifiers, the sounds of lin-
guistic expressions, leaving meaning to the brain’s conceptualizing facul-
ties, Lako¤ and Johnson go further, suggesting that ‘the locus of reason
(conceptual inference) would be the same as the locus of perception and
motor control, which are bodily functions’ (1999: 20). From the perspec-
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tive adopted in this paper, this suggests that perceptual variation or Vor-
stellung could likewise be argued to be intimately associated with literary
forms of conceptualization, a legitimate focus of literary semantics.
What is missing in Lako¤ and Johnson’s book is a satisfactory account
of cultural di¤erence and a greater acknowledgement of the role of the
social. This weakness is repaired to a large extent in the writings of Gilles
Fauconnier (1985, 1997; Fauconnier and Turner 2002) and especially
Mark Turner, whose emphasis on the implications of cognitive linguistics
for literary analysis must be regarded as a major contribution to literary
semantics (Turner 1987, 1991, 1994). Modifying the Protagorean thesis of
‘man as the measure of all things’ by a neurobiological emphasis, Turner
regards meaning as a unified and ‘necessary neurobiological endowment’
(Turner 1994: 95). This allows him to reject referential, formalist, and
syntactic definitions of meaning. He boldly declares that ‘culture cannot
be distinguished from neurobiology,’ (1994: 99) laying to rest a number
of orthodox dichotomies: objective versus subjective meaning, mind ver-
sus body, biology versus culture, innate versus acquired, genetics versus
experience. All that matters, according to Turner, is that evolution has
equipped the human organism with an ‘imaginative mind’ (1994: 104).
Here, as in his earlier work, Turner makes room for Vorstellung as an in-
dispensable ingredient of semantics, a feature he foregrounds when he in-
terprets literary texts (Turner 1987, 1991). Now Vorstellung can be said to
have reentered the theorization of natural language.
6. Corporeal pragmatics
Vorstellung is at the heart of corporeal semantics (Ruthrof 1997, 2000)
whose principles relevant to literary semantics can be summed up as fol-
lows: If the basic assumptions and preliminary findings of cognitive lin-
guistics are right, and there is no evidence to date that they are wrong,
then the theorization of natural language must seriously review its
presuppositions, definitions and conclusions. Another consequence of the
insights of cognitive linguistics is, contrary to Lako¤ and Johnson’s anti-
philosophical claims, that many of the traditional views on language from
Locke to Kant, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty to Heidegger and Schutz, as well
as some recent feminist positions become relevant once more in certain
respects. In the most general terms, the neurocognitive approach to lan-
guage o¤ers an avenue for repairing the rift between language and per-
ception that has characterized linguistic theorization for over a century.
Corporeal semantics is an attempt at an axiomatic delineation of the
kind of principles required for arguments in favor of such a connection.
Vorstellung in literary semantics 289
At the heart of such a program is the notion of meaning as the event of
linguistic signifiers being activated by nonverbal signs, such as olfactory,
gustatory, tactile, haptic, emotional, kinetic, or visual realizations. Natu-
ral language as a syntactic sequence of signifiers is an empty grid in need
of ‘concretization’ by our nonverbal, quasi-perceptual readings of the
world. We could say, then, that language is parasitic on nonverbal icon-
icity, in the broad sense of Peirce’s term. In this scenario, only signifiers
are arbitrary, while ‘at the level of the signified we are iconic beings’
(Ruthrof 2000: 152). To avoid mentalist or subjectivist charges being
made against corporeal semantics, cultural communities are argued to
provide the framing conditions and monitoring mechanisms for language
practice as the largely habitual association of verbal and nonverbal signi-
fication. Lastly, in corporeal semantics, meaning is dissociated from truth-
conditions, which are replaced by what I have termed ‘su‰cient semiosis’
(2000: 152). In light of such an axiomatic frame, corporeal semantics de-
mands the redefinition of the Saussurean linguistic sign as consisting of a
largely unmotivated (arbitrary) signifier (Sr) and, contrary to Saussure, a
motivated signified (Sd) made up of nonverbal signification. In agreement
with Saussure, however, the linguistic sign only exists as a combination of
the two. The motivated signified which permits perception and Vorstellung
to enter into language and the secondary role of syntax are the main stays
of corporeal semantics.
Corporeal semantics di¤ers from cognitive linguistics methodologically
and in some important details, such as inevitable interpretive opacities
(Ruthrof 2000: 53). While cognitive linguistics is a bottom-up, scientifi-
cally grounded enterprise, corporeal semantics takes a speculative, top-
down perspective, asking what kinds of conditions we must stipulate to
explain what appears to be happening in social language use. Here cogni-
tive linguistics acts as a supporting discipline. The most significant di¤er-
ence between the two approaches, as far as details are concerned, is the
almost exclusive focus on visual schematization and spatial mapping in
cognitive linguistics. This inclination appears to be driven by the neural
research paradigm rather than by what happens in natural language use.
Corporeal semantics, in contrast, highlights the broad spread of non-
verbal significations that make up our overall perceptual grasp of our
world, including its most extravagant modifications in Vorstellung.
If we accept the traditional distinction between semantics and prag-
matics as one between a schema of abstracted linguistic rules on the one
hand and, on the other, a schematization of language in use, including
speakers and cultural speech situations, then corporeal semantics can
never be a semantics in any purist sense. Corporeal semantics is always al-
ready a pragmatics. The main reason is that on the side of the signified,
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the nonverbal mental material required for the activation of signifiers,
speakers and sociocultural speech situation are always already part of the
description (Ruthrof 1997: 131–136). This is particularly obvious when
we approach literary texts and literary semantics from the perspective of
corporeal semantics. Without our constructions in Vorstellung of possible
speech and reading situations, with all the generic, historical, psychologi-
cal, cultural, sociological, and political ingredients that typically bring to
bear on the signifiers in question, meaning making would be an impover-
ished activity; and a literary semantics unable to cope with such complex-
ities would hardly be worth the e¤ort.
7. Conclusion: The sting in the tail
Vorstellung, then, is at the heart not only of corporeal pragmatics, but
also of literary semantics as a pragmatics. Every interpretive act involving
the projection of a literary ‘world’ is of necessity the performance of a so-
cial, cultural event. What appears to single out literary performance from
ordinary speech events, apart from generic markers indicating a certain
degree of Kantian practical ‘purposelessless,’ is perhaps no more than an
emphasis on Vorstellung over perceptual grasp. Greater emphasis on Vor-
stellung means that su‰cient semiosis can be disregarded and our imagi-
native exploration given full rein. Put di¤erently, once we have decided
to read a text in a literary fashion, the activation of the signifiers by non-
verbal signification is maximized rather than constrained by the actual,
that is, the realist function of Vorstellung is largely suspended. Our activ-
ity of cashing in the linguistic signifiers by nonverbal, quasi-perceptual
iconic forms is open-ended and forever expanding. In this picture of
literary semantics, Derrida’s endless chain of signifiers is matched by an
‘equally’ endless chain of nonverbal signifieds.
I have argued elsewhere for a rewriting of the agenda of theorizations
of language by a procedure in reverse, starting with the most complex
forms of language, exemplified in literary formations, our global language
laboratory, in order to show what kind of reductions are required to
climb down the ladder of discourse towards technical language, formal
logic, and the binary-digital code (Ruthrof 1992: 1–13, 133–164). What
emerged was the two-fold reduction of reference to speakers and speech
situations and reference to the ‘world.’ In literary reading, we are guided
to construe the most elaborate scenarios for both forms of referential pro-
jections; as we approach the domain of formal semiosis, both shrink to
zero. This suggests that literary semantics cannot fruitfully choose a Fre-
gean or post-Saussurean, merely syntactic starting point where sequences
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of signifiers have taken center stage. And if this argument goes through,
we need to concede two serious consequences, one for literary semantics
and one for the study of natural languages. For in both, Vorstellung plays
a pivotal role.
For literary semantics, this means a turning to the complexities that
characterize literary reading, permitting the emergence of the force and
richness of the deictic, explicit and implicit, and referential potential of
language. Such a literary semantics, rather than heavily leaning on ap-
proaches extraneous if not hostile to its definiendum, would mould or at
least inform its definiens out of its own resources. This would require any
application of tools to literary readings to respond to and foreground
those features that make literary readings what they are: the richest possi-
ble activation of signifiers by the signifieds of Vorstellung.
The sting in the tail is this. Because the corpus of literary texts (how-
ever contested in both directions, as a minimal set or as a certain manner
of reading any kind of text) constitutes the storehouse of the resources of
what can be done with language, and because Vorstellung plays such a
crucial role in their activation, it should be considered as a central ingre-
dient of all natural language use. In this respect and in a methodological
sense, Derrida can be said to have made a major contribution to literary
semantics, by having turned literature from an ‘object of study’ into a
‘tool of analysis’ (Rajagopalan 1998: 92). Yet to achieve such a reversal
on a broad front, the theorization of language must once more reconcile
two domains kept artificially apart: linguistics and perceptual grasp, in-
cluding Vorstellung. This at least seems to me to be one of the legitimate
consequences of Trevor Eaton’s demand for literary semantics to provide
‘meta-theoretical implications for linguistics as a whole’ (Eaton 1999:
135).
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